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Abstract: Klein & Barron argue that insects are capable of subjective experience, i.e., sentience.
Whereas we mostly agree with the conclusion of their arguments, we think there is an even
more important message to be learned from their work. The line of reasoning opened by Klein &
Barron proves instructive for how neuroscientists can and should explore the biological
phenomenon of consciousness.
Keywords: Arthropoda, Bilateria, cephalisation, invertebrate neurobiology, LUCSA, Nephrozoa,
sensory integration, Urbilateria, Xenacoelamorpha

Eirik Søvik is an associate professor at
Volda University College. He studies the
function of biogenic amine systems in
insects and their relation to reward
processing.
http://eiriksovik.com

Clint J. Perry, Marie Curie postdoctoral
fellow, Queen Mary University of
London, uses integrative neurobiology
to explore the cognitive capacities of
insects and the underlying mechanisms
of memory, learning and emotion.
http://chittkalab.sbcs.qmul.ac.uk/Clint.html

1

Animal Sentience 2016.135: Søvik & Perry on Klein & Barron on Insect Experience

1. Scientific Approaches to Consciousness
Consciousness, once thought to be supernatural and unique to humans, is now known,
undoubtedly, to be the product of animal evolution. This means that consciousness, even as
experienced by humans, is the result of gradual modification of pre-existing traits. The only
possible conclusion from this is that the animals around us possess various forms of
consciousness that primarily differ from ours by degree. Unless we resort to supernatural
explanations, this is indisputable.
It is, however, very contentious to what degree different animals are conscious, i.e., how they
experience their world. The only animal for which we can say anything with certainty is humans
(but see “the problem of other minds,” Hyslop, 2016). This has led to extensive arguments
about the machinery, biological or otherwise, required for consciousness. This discussion has
primarily been limited to mammals (Seth, Baars, and Edelman, 2005) and other vertebrates
(Cabanac, Cabanac, and Parent, 2009; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013). The consequence of this
restriction has been that most researchers have assumed invertebrates to be void of
consciousness, something akin to how we imagine a thermostat experiencing regulating
temperature.
2. Consciousness in Invertebrate Animals
In the philosophy of consciousness, sentience is the ability to feel (anything at all) subjectively.
Klein & Barron (K & B) refer to this as subjective experience (Barron & Klein, 2016; Klein &
Barron, 2016) and have rejected the notion of “simple” invertebrates, setting forth the claim
that insects are capable of sentience. Although this claim may seem radical, K & B’s assessment
is relatively straightforward and makes intuitive sense, from both a biological and an
evolutionary perspective. More important, in our view, their papers clearly attempt to define
the requirement for sentience: a rudimentary sense of space. K & B do not mean just the ability
to move through the environment and respond to external stimuli (e.g., a robot tracking a light
source), but rather centralised integration of motor output and sensory input. This allows an
organism to keep track of how it moves through space and how space (and the elements within
that space) moves around it. K & B argue that having this somato-spatial capacity is
necessary/sufficient for sentience. Here we avoid delving deeper into this claim and instead
attempt to see where such a naturalistic hypothesis of sentience can take us.
3. The Evolution of Consciousness and LUCSA
This simple claim leads to a few predictions about sentience that make it possible to start the
arduous work of tracing its evolutionary origins and history. A centralised nervous system (CNS)
capable of integrating sensory information and motor output is required. Sentience can
therefore not have emerged prior to nervous system cephalisation, and sentience cannot exist
outside of Bilateria (Fig. 1A), as this is the only place we find CNS. The pattern of cephalisation
observed in Xenacoelomorpha (Gavilan et al., 2015) makes it unlikely that Urbilateria, the
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ancestor of all bilateral animals, was sentient (Fig. 1B). Within Nephrazoa we find cephalisation
in all major branches (Fig. 1A), so it could have originated prior to the split between these
groups.

Figure 1. (A) The only place in nature we find animals with
centralised nervous systems is within Bilateria. Phylogeny
based on Dunn, Giribet, Edgecombe, and Hejnol (2014). (B) It
is unlikely that centralised nervous systems evolved before
Xaenocoelomorpha
and
Nephrozoa
split
because
Xenoturbellia have only epidermal nerve nets. It is also
unlikely that sentience evolved independently within Acoela
because their nervous system appears incapable of the kind of
integration hypothesized. Phylogeny based on Cannon et al.
(2016).

We are thus left with two interesting scenarios: sentience predates the division of proto- and
deuterostomes, or it evolved independently multiple times. K & B briefly mention the former
scenario, drawing on a recent article by Strausfeld and Hirth (2013), who argue that
morphological and transcriptomic similarities between arthropod and vertebrate core control
systems result from a common ancient origin. This is indeed a very tantalising hypothesis; it
means that the ancestor of all nephrozoan animals was sentient. This ancestor, the Last
Universal Common Sentient Ancestor (LUCSA), must, at a minimum, have had a nervous system
with a higher brain centre, perhaps similar to the insect central complex. To determine whether
the LUCSA hypothesis is correct, many hurdles still need to be cleared. There are rival
explanations of why higher brain regions in disparate animals appear similar; we, like others
(e.g., Farris, 2015), believe that the current evidence points more strongly towards homoplasy
than conservation.
The LUCSA hypothesis suggests some interesting conjectures, for example, that sentience
originated only once and has been lost numerous times. K & B mention how nematodes lack the
machinery for sentience, but LUCSA suggests that this was not because their lifestyle never
necessitated it, but because it was lost. Nematodes are just one example among many, as most
nephrozoan phyla do not have integration centres (Fig. 2).
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Figure 2. With the exception of
Echinodermata, all animal phyla
within Nephrozoa have centralised
nervous systems. However, only a
few groups have the dense
neuropils that may be required for
the integration of sensory input and
motor output that gives animals a
sense of space. Phylogeny after
Dunn et al. (2014).

Of course, we do not yet know what kind of neural machinery is required for the kind of
integration envisioned by K & B. Nor do we have a functional characterisation of the existing
circuitry within most of these phyla. To move forward with this question it might be instructive
to investigate what has occurred at the family, genus, and species levels. For example, among
the insects we have many examples of species that have gone through extreme miniaturization,
discarding the majority of their brain (sometimes even dispensing with the nucleus of their
neurons, Polilov, 2012). By studying the neural circuitry of these insects, it might be possible to
determine whether they retained the same functional integration despite severely reduced
neural tissue. A basic wiring-plan across all of Nephrozoa comprising a very limited number of
neurons that allow for sentience would make LUCSA a lot more plausible.
4. The Future of Consciousness Research
This may all sound like idle speculation at this point, and we completely agree, but it opens an
important door. We are certain that if we want to understand consciousness, we must take a
scientific approach and resolve the evolutionary history of this trait. We thus have two very
important tasks ahead of us: (1) we must try to come to terms empirically with what kinds of
“cognitive machinery” are necessary to support sentience, and (2) we must investigate widely
across animal phyla, including amongst the invertebrates, to determine where they are present.
On a final note, if the K & B predictions should be wrong, and, say, temporal integration is what
matters (Engel and Singer, 2001), it will of course change specific statements above, but the
overall point remains: consciousness is accessible to a naturalistic understanding.
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